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Abstract 
It is common to oppose a secular Europe to a religious America. As representatives of cultural 
diversity and popular sovereignty, Parliaments are the best illustrations of mutual arrangements 
between politics and religion. Little data is available on religion at the EP, in contrast to the rich 
scholarship on the Congress. Relying on the first survey of its kind on members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs), the article analyses what they believe and what they do with these beliefs. The 
purpose is to understand how religion interacts with representation and political socialization of MEPs 
within and outside the assembly. The American House of Representatives is used as a reference case 
study. Overall, there are significant differences between European and American legislators, mainly 
due to their distinct social, cultural, political and institutional environments. However, several 
common logics may also be seen at work, suggesting that the EU is not as exceptional as is often 
thought. 
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 1 
In the present re-emergence of religion on the political and intellectual agenda, the transatlantic 
comparison is recurrent. “Godless Europe” is contrasted with American religiosity to emphasize that 
secularization does not necessarily go hand in hand with modernity. The EU is invited by some 
observers to enter into a post-secular era, making room for believers in the public space and in the 
definition of collective preferences. 
The US does indeed offer a stimulating “Constitutive Other” for the understanding of the EU, both 
because of its similarities and its differences. It is multi-level governance, a multi-cultural polity and a 
mature democracy. The stronger social relevance of religion in the US has the advantage of 
highlighting the logics at work with more clarity than in Europe. The American example may thus be 
used as a reference case study, especially since there is a huge literature on religion and politics, 
contrary to the relative thinness of European scholarship. This is not to say that the EU should be 
equated with the American State. Restrictions stemming from the nature and limits of the European 
political community and the range of the EU’s competences as regards the regulation of spiritual 
affairs are numerous. Still, the transatlantic perspective enables recognition of the EU as a full political 
system, likely to produce effects in all policy sectors and to reframe identities and allegiances. Our 
analysis stands close to the emergent hypothesis of a normalization of the EU, which justifies its 
rapprochement with more classic polities. The purpose here is to use parliamentary assemblies as 
prisms magnifying the relationships between religion and politics. As representative bodies elected by 
universal suffrage, parliaments reflect social and cultural diversity as well as possible distortions 
introduced by the recruitment channels which select legislators
1
.  
Regarding sources and methodology, the American case is mostly dealt with by relying on existing 
scholarship and interviews with experts, notwithstanding some fieldwork (participatory observation 
and documentary analysis) in Washington in 2010-2011 and 2014. There is no claim either to produce 
knowledge on religion in US politics or to offer a full term-by-term comparison with European 
politics. Studies on the Congress are used as a methodological source of inspiration and as a touchtone 
to assess the specificity of findings on the EP. For the EU, the core source of data is a survey on 
religion at the European Parliament (EP). The Religion at the European Parliament project (RelEP), 
the first endeavor of its kind, aims at remedying the lack of data on the religious profile, beliefs and 
uses of European political elites. It relied on a questionnaire applied to 167 MEPs
2
 of various national 
and party belongings.  
The focus of this article is neither to understand how and to what extent religion may impact on 
European politics, decision-making and policy processes nor to compare national differences between 
member states in the way they relate to religion and the subsequent effects on Europeanization
3
, two 
important topics tackled in other publications. Rather, the purpose is to discuss how the place of 
religion in society drives the way parliamentarians deal with it and its status in the relation of 
representation. What is at stake is, on the one hand, the influence of the social, cultural, political and 
institutional contexts in determining the treatment of religion in parliamentary institutions; and on the 
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other hand, the possible role of religion as a vector of socialization within institutions, bridging party 
and cultural gaps.  
As the EU arena where conflicting interests or worldviews are expressed, the European Parliament 
is a privileged field in which to observe the political effects of religion. In the US, the House of 
Representatives is the most comparable legislating body, due to its mode of election and its size. 
Differences, however, should be kept constantly in mind. A Congressman (the name commonly 
designates a member of the House, even if technically speaking a Senator also belongs to the 
Congress) represents about 650,000 citizens, but with great discrepancies between for example Alaska 
and California. He or she bears comparison with an MEP from a big member state who represents 
more than 875,000 voters, with significant variations between countries
4
. American scholarship on 
religion in Congress is useful on several questions. A first point is the difficulty of measuring the 
religious belonging of politicians. Broad religious affiliation (Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, etc.) are 
sometimes criticized as unable to encompass many theological nuances and historical circumstances 
which are explanatory of various divergent political choices by specific religious groups (Lutherans, 
Baptists, etc.). Nevertheless, breaking down denominations into smaller categories may bring accuracy 
but also more difficulty, as precision may always be taken further and may depend only 
problematically on theological distinctions. Hence, broad denominations are still widely considered to 
be useful proxies
5
. This is all the more true in Europe, where religious diversity is less important.  
Besides, the analysis of religion at the House of Representatives highlights several variables which 
may be tested at the European Parliament. Religion indeed matters in American parliamentary politics, 
admittedly with less strength than partisanship and ideology, but still in a significant way. It gives 
purposes and incentives to political actors. Religiously-loaded issues create cleavages, but these 
cleavages evolve across time and events. The way to relate to Islam became an identity marker after 
September 11. Homosexuality or abortion have structured different patterns and intensities of alliances 
and loyalty following evolutions in jurisprudence and political strategies of presidential 
administrations and religious civil society. This indirectness and fluidity of the influence of religion 
must be kept in mind by looking at what happens in the EP.  
In order to assess similarities and divergences between American and European configurations, the 
influence of social, political and institutional contexts has to be clarified. The social and cultural 
context is the general background against which to understand representativeness, how a politician 
represents his or her electors, and the role that religion can play in this symbolic relationship. The 
social and cultural context refers to the individual religiosity of political actors in its relation to the 
religious beliefs of the electorate; to the implications of belonging to a specific denomination 
according to the place of this group in society; to the way politics may encompass diversity, by 
promoting it or restraining it; and to the role of religion in the political socialization of a decision-
maker, within the legislative institution, in the capital, in the constituency and in the global political 
space. 
Political and institutional contexts are constituted by opportunities and constraints offered by the 
general political system and the institution within which a parliamentarian operates. Rules, processes 
and practices determine whether traditional and normative discourses such as religion are more or less 
legitimate and audible. Religion may be business as usual for Parliaments or create specific settings, 
divides and strategies. This can be assessed through the way the assembly accommodates individual 
and collective manifestations of faith in its rituals or working patterns. A last question investigates 
whether or not the assembly is able to frame what representatives believe and do with their beliefs on 
the one hand, and religious issues on the other hand. The framing of individual preferences can be 
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assessed by observing the effect of the longevity of legislators in the assembly on how they handle 
religion. Regarding religious issues, the socializing effect of the institution can be measured by the 
emergence (or not) of a modus vivendi to regulate conflicts on controversial topics that have long been 
on the agenda. 
This article proceeds in three parts. The first part outlines the American model of articulating 
political representation and religion in the Congress. It shows that religion is a reference that 
representatives are obliged to display in order to comply with social expectations, but that they are 
well advised to use with moderation and in a consensual way. Pluralism is also reflected by the 
composition of the assembly, where many denominational minorities are represented and can achieve 
high office. But pluralism finds its limits with its difficulties in integrating a lack of religion, or 
identities in tension with religion, such as homosexuality. Finally, religion is a vector of socialization 
for legislators in various settings: in interfaith forums; as part of the institutional ritual of the 
Congress; as networks in the capital; as social capital in the constituencies, and through religious 
lobbying. The second part of the article applies the analytical frame forged around the Congress to the 
European Parliament. Most MEPs comply with the moderate secularism which is dominant in 
European societies. Expressions of religiosity are secondary to and commanded by national political 
cultures. Pluralism is more limited than in the US, due to a lesser religious diversity and a weaker 
religiosity. Hence, opportunities of socialization through religious channels are significantly more 
limited. Still more than in the US, entrepreneurship based on a strong religious message is reserved for 
minority forces, frequently on the extremes, and is unlikely to pave the way to power. A final part 
compares the potential socializing action of the parliamentary institution in the US and in the EU. This 
is measured through the effects on the religious preferences of representatives on the one hand, and on 
the framing of religious issues on the other hand. Neither the Congress nor the EP seems to have an in-
depth transformative impact, even if parliamentary politics may provide incentives for compromise 
and rhetorical moderation on religious topics.  
Religion and Representation  
The American model 
To believe, whatever the content, but not too much 
Like American Presidents, Representatives are expected to display their religious credentials, but 
without exaggeration. Presenting oneself as a religious person is a matter of patriotism and public 
decency, the content and the extent of faith being of less importance. However, excessive ardor may 
be unwise, as it may endanger the religious freedom of fellow citizens whose faith is less intense or 
who belong to another denomination. Therefore, a Congressman will comply with the obligations 
linked to his or her role and exhibit the religiosity required by public virtue, but to go beyond these 
minimal requirements may be counter-productive: it may hurt the feelings of fellow representatives, 
lobbies or electors. The best strategy is thus to display religious feelings at appropriate moments and 
to remain silent otherwise. This is confirmed by an expert on Congressional life: “You do not see 
religion mentioned that much in the debates that take place in the House. You do not see members of 
the House appealing directly to specific verses of the Bible to support their argument. They speak in 
more general terms about the moral stature of the country, where we are going. There are too many 
different denominations to be efficient when appealing to a specific tradition to gain the argument. 
(…)”6 
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In interviews, legislators and staff insist on the importance of personal values – explicitly and 
prominently religious values – in decision-making. The singularity of the incentive and the political 
risk involved is reduced by the fact that there is a supposed correspondence between the legislator’s 
attitudes and modal preferences of his constituency. The legislator’s values are thought to reflect those 
of the electors. Thus, the political danger of any discrepancy is low.  
This general safety rule may leave room for provisos and exceptions. Constituency preferences 
evolve, either by demographic change (although this is unlikely in a single term) or above all because 
the context changes and alter the relevance of moral issues. The congruence between the personal 
religious preferences of the decision-maker and those whom he or she represents thus needs to be 
constantly reassessed
7
. The political context may have changed since the election and altered the views 
of the electorate if not those of the legislator.  
It is a general rule that legislators declare that their personal beliefs are of more importance than 
any pressure from their constituencies. It cannot be reasonably expected from a politician that he or 
she present himself or herself as a servile follower of opinion permanently begging for re-election. 
Nevertheless, some representatives justify voting against their conscience on the grounds that they feel 
they have to comply with the mandate given to them. In some even more complex cases, they can vote 
in opposition to their personal preferences and the moral orientations of their constituents because they 
consider that religion should not interact with politics or that policy matters require them to do so. 
More generally, as most Americans favor a moderate line, holding an extreme position and 
accepting the risk of making compromise impossible and of blocking the work of the legislature is a 
huge responsibility
8
. A refusal in the name of absolute values to cooperate in order to reach a solution 
acceptable to all is a behavior which is probably negative in any cost/benefit calculus for the majority 
of legislators. Exceptions may be extreme fighters for God who are entrenched in very homogeneously 
conservative constituencies, meaning that the phenomenon will be quantitatively limited given the 
heterogeneity of the US electoral map. 
The comparison of the religiosity of electors and representatives is a key question which has not 
been so extensively studied in American scholarship. In a pioneering work published in 1982, 
representatives were described as no less religious than citizens; political liberals were no less 
religious than conservatives. Overall, believers displayed a certain compliance with the orthodoxy 
dictated by churches and scripture, revealing a low level of individualization of faith. Denominational 
belonging did not ensure conformity of voting with fellow believers of the same group and could not 
predict the choices made by a representative. However, it constituted a major influence on his other 
political behaviors, an influence intertwined with party affiliation and constituency pressures
9
. In the 
1980s and 1990s, the literature focused on public opinion and the influences of religious extremes on 
the centre, offering conflicting evidence about the real political weight of religion. A core question is 
the reality and extent of polarization, understood as the radicalization of conflicts over social and 
moral issues between irreconcilable visions of “the good society” rooted in religion. A moderate 
proposal
10
 is that there is no sign that public opinion has polarized, but rather the contrary. However, 
religion has polarized as a party identifier. More and more, religiously-loaded issues like abortion 
draw the boundaries between people who identify themselves as Republicans or Democrats. A survey 
on roll call votes between 1977 and 2010
11
 shows a general polarization since the eighties on all issues 
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in the Congress, and especially on welfare and moral issues, with an apex centered on abortion. These 
issues related to morality politics have become more and more important in the ideological definition 
of party identity. Politicians are expected to express their conformity with their party’s orthodoxy in 
such debates if they wish to emerge from the processes of selection of candidates. This leads to a 
growing polarization between parties disguised along religious lines. This does not mean that 
representatives are more religious or vocal on their beliefs than before, but that they take up more 
distinctive profiles on normative issues. Meanwhile, the opinions of citizens on such issues have 
somewhat converged. Consequently, religiously-based divides are more apparent at elite level than at 
mass level.  
This is an invitation to question the hypothesis of polarization at the societal scale. Most Americans 
are moderate, ambivalent or hesitant in their views. Moral issues do not constitute “hot-buttons” which 
dictate voters’ political choice in preference to other issues. It may be useful to distinguish between a 
polarization of people's choices (among the options that are offered by candidates) and a polarization 
of their positions (what surveys show about their opinions on moral issues). Elections are frequently 
close, but this does not mean that two opposing blocks are colliding. A majority of voters see 
themselves as positioned between two relatively extreme parties, and they make their choices from the 
existing electoral offer
12
. Depictions of polarizations fuel narratives in terms of culture wars opposing 
religious minorities victimized by a secularist majority and system well beyond the walls of the 
Congress. This narrative is an efficient resource with which to mobilize followers. It is also a business 
ploy: political and media entrepreneurs build careers on fighting fight against diabolized opponents 
and they are not likely to relinquish this rewarding position
13
. This is why even if social and political 
realities evolve, such symbolic struggles are not likely to fade away, as neither side is powerful 
enough to defeat the other and powerful interests on both sides find it useful to prolong the strife.  
Representation as a slightly distorted reproduction of American social realities 
Representatives who want to make a point on religious issues for personal reasons or who have to do 
so in order to satisfy their constituencies will find plenty of opportunities for this. It is not necessary to 
build a profile in courage by taking a stand on risky issues with a controversial religious dimension. 
Skilled politicians will take positions on symbolic but petty bills, especially those which enjoy a wide 
consensus (for example to secure family values, a sound-bite of American politics, rather than to 
oppose abortion), in order to show their religious zeal back home without breaking either with party 
discipline or mainstream moderation. But even if representatives are not obliged to take up such 
symbolic postures, they would prefer to avoid openly distancing themselves from religion. On Capitol 
Hill as well as in most US constituencies, it is better not to declare oneself a non-religious person 
unless one wants to make a statement and one is ready to pay the political price. In 2007, the 
Californian Democrat Pete Stark, affiliated as a Unitarian and an incumbent since 1973, became the 
first member of Congress to declare that he does not believe in a Supreme Being, a somewhat tardy 
piece of audacity after more than thirty years of compliance. Others prefer not to be specific about 
their beliefs but do not express an absence of beliefs. About one in five U.S. adults describe 
themselves as atheist, agnostic or “nothing in particular”. But in 2012, only one member of the new 
Congress, a Democrat from Arizona, dared to publicly describe her religion as “none”, while ten other 
members of the 113th Congress (about 2%) did not specify a religious affiliation
14
. Such a posture is 
already difficult for a Democrat to take up, and almost impossible for a Republican.  
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This combination of mandatory if symbolic religious exhibition and strategic moderation may 
explain why American legislators declare a higher level of religiosity than average Americans. As 
representatives, they have to embody American political culture and showing at least a minimal 
religiosity is part of this function. This qualifies the hypothesis of a socio-cultural gap between 
secularized elites in Washington and religious masses in the backwoods. The religious composition of 
the Congress reflects the denominational diversity of the US population, even if statistical balances are 
not reproduced exactly. The Pew Forum regularly provides data on Congress that is still not available 
for the European Parliament. Taking as an example the 113th Congress, the assembly remains 
majority Protestant (56%), but is far less so today than half a century ago, when nearly three-quarters 
of the members belonged to Protestant denominations. Diversity is not to be understood as the 
continuing emergence of new religious groups. On the contrary, between 1959 and 2010, the number 
of denominations represented at the Senate has decreased from 18 to 15
15
. But small movements occur 
between and within existing religious groups and parties, possibly with big effects. For example, there 
has been a movement of Conservative Protestants from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party 
in the Congress. This reinforces both the conservative tropism of Republicans and the progressive 
mainstream of Democrats and contributes to the polarization of Congress. Besides this, there has been 
a decline in the presence of liberal and moderate Protestants in both parties, people who could bridge 
party boundaries and build compromises leading to bipartisan legislation. This is another factor 
contributing to bipolarization
16
. This illustrates the huge complexity of the intertwinement of religious 
and political cleavages in legislative arenas, and both the interactions and the possible discrepancies 
between the religious maps of the American population and of American representatives. 
Religious diversification has for long been the pattern and this continues. Variations between 
denominations reflect societal trends at work in the US more than political circumstances. The 
electoral victories of Republicans or Democrats cause adjustments but no major shifts from one term 
to another. This was even true in 1994, when the Republicans won their first majority in the House of 
Representatives since 1954, and remained so during their control of the House which lasted until 
2006
17
. Influence is not always measured strictly by numbers. The geographical distribution and 
historical and socio-economic backgrounds of each community are also crucial parameters, as well as 
the organizational efficiency of each religious community both as regards party apparatus and at 
grassroots level. Catholics are often considered as a model for mobilization and lobbying. Jews are a 
very secularized and discrete group but are well represented. Mormons enjoy strong positions due to 
their territorial concentration. Muslims
18
, Buddhists and Hindus do not have the same resources and 
are rather under-represented. 
Indeed, the distribution of power between denominations is not only about arithmetic and 
geography. Some scholars insist on the way religious stratification in the US has acted to maintain 
lasting inequalities since colonial times and the birth of the modern nation
19
. The privileges of 
historically-dominant religious affiliations are said to have been maintained over time through formal 
and informal mechanisms. These religious affiliations are still largely an ascribed and permanent 
status and have important effects on access to resources. Legal patterns have evolved to prohibit 
discrimination, but dominant groups have developed other ways of maintaining their positions. They 
have nominated political candidates from their religious groups, voted for and appointed similar 
(Contd.)                                                                  
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people, and created their own lobbying groups. At the ideological level, liberal Protestant values have 
remained the societal norm. Individualism, rationality, tolerance, and democracy are still the cultural 
standards against which all other religious traditions are judged and with which they are invited to 
comply. Davidson and Pyle conclude that Anglo-Protestant ideology has been impacted by 
multiculturalism but has not been supplanted or replaced by it. Religious stratification has continued to 
operate as an underlying force behind American politics. Religious groups maintain their positions or 
move slightly from one stratum to another
20
. Parliamentary assemblies are one arena among many 
where these movements may be observed. The success of some individuals from minority 
denominations does not necessarily challenge the idea of a resilient inequality of resources between 
religious groups on a societal scale. This is an acknowledgment of the structural resistance of religion 
in the allocation of power in the US. 
Another way to assess the place of religious minorities in parliamentary politics is to look at their 
access to top positions. Protestants still keep a firm hand on posts of authority. Nevertheless, Catholics 
can rely on their organizational skills and their relative number to secure positions such as Speaker of 
the House (with the Democrat Nancy Pelosi), or minority leader (with the Republican John Boehner), 
during the recent past. Jews may be said to be more present in the higher ranks of presidential 
administrations than in parliamentary hierarchies, but some fare very well (for example House 
Majority Leader Eric Cantor, the only Jewish Republican in Congress). The occasional Mormon is 
able to achieve high office, such as Harry Reid as majority leader in the Senate, but this remains 
relatively rare. So access to the top is difficult but not impossible for politicians from small religious 
denominations. The combined logics of party politics, personal skills and representativeness based on 
pure demography combine to produce unexpected results. The Congress appears as more conservative 
as regards minority religious affiliations than other institutions such as the Supreme Court, which is 
made up entirely of Catholics and Jews for the first time in its history. The selection of Justices relies 
mostly on legal processes and presidential decisions, factors which can evolve more quickly and 
boldly than mass politics and electoral choices
21
. 
Religious identity may also have an influence on other social identities claimed by legislators. 
Being openly gay is infrequent but not unheard of. The announcement of his homosexuality by the 
first member of the House of Representatives dates back to 1982. A few others followed this example 
and this did not prevent them from being re-elected. Nevertheless, the first candidate to be elected for 
the first time as a gay person achieved this only in 1998. Some Representatives preferred to keep silent 
even if they were known as homosexuals in their districts. Others encountered problems when their 
sexual preferences were disclosed. It is worth noticing that it is only since 2012 that there has been the 
first openly gay member in the Senate, the Democrat verify Tammy Baldwin from Wisconsin. This 
delay has to do with the smaller size of the upper house, and probably also with its mode of election 
which may be more challenging for sexual minorities as constituencies encompass a greater variety of 
population, including possibly more conservative parts.  
Religion in social circles 
Representatives are likely to keep a low profile about religion. Whatever their private beliefs, they will 
frequently speak of religion in ad-hoc fashion with like-minded people and limit their expressions on 
this subject in the public arena. “There is no constitutional stricture about not talking about religion 
but members realize that religious references are not going to win any votes by appealing to particular 
religious beliefs. You have to make a larger argument. Politics is about additions. You try to build 
coalitions and to make it bigger”22. References to religion are mostly part of the ritual of civil religion 
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which is a dramatization of national identity borrowing religious vocabulary. The reality of religious 
observance is to be kept for appropriate circles. “People are not afraid to discuss their religion with 
people they want to talk about it, but they are not wearing it on their sleeves, they may be wearing the 
American flag but mostly not the Christian Cross. They mostly manifest their faith in the way they talk 
and relate to people”23.  
Being a religious activist is not rewarding in the American context. Truly enough, an increasing 
“God Gap” has been evoked by the media in the last thirty years to state that religion is increasingly 
becoming a party identifier. Efforts by president Obama to reach out towards religious populations 
have met with only limited success. In his first term, Obama managed to a small extent to win over 
groups that are usually not Democrat. But his second term is likely to confirm the resilience of the 
usual alliance between Democrats, minority denominations and secularists
24
 as controversies about 
homosexuality and abortion are bound to reactivate polarization.  
This does not mean that the “God Gap” frames global attitudes towards politics, but rather that it 
works as an inspiration whose associations are used to flag up issues in the competition between 
parties. Republicans and Democrats pay tribute to their party identity on symbolic issues such as sex 
and family (especially abortion and gay marriage)
25
 while frequently leaving decisions on these 
matters to the judges and compromising on other questions. Political actors who chose to invest on 
religion as their key cause may gain visibility but are likely to be marginalized and condemned to have 
little impact on mainstream politics. This is exemplified by the “Christian right” which, under different 
forms and labels, has established itself as an important faction of the Republican party but has not 
really succeeded in pushing its agenda on moral issues. The dilemma is to opt for moderation in 
Washington at the price of cutting links with grassroots networks able to raise funds and activism; to 
show intransigence and subsequently to fail building a majority coalition within the Conservative 
party; or to venture into dissidence, an example being political entrepreneurs choosing to run under the 
colors of the Tea Party
26
. In other words, professionalization for a very pious and outspoken 
representative in DC involves compliance with the rules of moderation which go with the 
parliamentary territory, and learning to live with the subsequent constant risk of losing one’s soul and 
the loyalty of one’s followers as well with the recurrent temptation to withdraw from politics in order 
to return to civil society.  
The future of the Christian right is ambivalent. Some scholars argue that conservative values are on 
the rise in the whole of American society (a far from consensual view), but that there is no consensus 
about the precise role that religion should play
27
. So this faction could lose its ideological ownership of 
some key topics and see its distinctive identity blurred without reaching concrete achievements in 
return. The crucial battle will take place in the media and in other public spaces as much as in political 
arenas. The Christian right has shown its strong resilience as a social movement and has gained 
significant electoral influence, but has had less success in the public policy domain. It failed on the 
crucial issue of obtaining a constitutional amendment in order to prohibit abortion. The present 
strategy seems more oriented towards State politics, to reduce abortion by creating multiple 
restrictions in practice. This suggests that the context of the House of Representatives and, more 
broadly speaking, of federal politics imposes a restraint that the Christian right tries to skirt around at 
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other levels. Changes in the social constituency of the Christian right also matter. Evangelical 
churches are developing, but while younger generations of Evangelicals are more pro-life, they are 
more moderate on gay rights than their parents. They are more concerned by world hunger, AIDS and 
global warming, and more eager to engage with the world. “The Christian Right has built its 
organizations by proclaiming a culture war, but many younger evangelicals see the country not as a 
battlefield, but as a mission field”28. 
As an inverted reflection of the Christian right, it is also worth noticing how secularist forces are 
structured. This trend can be observed at all levels: through their strengthening within the Democratic 
Party; through their mobilization as lobbies with new allies, such as gay NGOs, medical professions or 
scientists stung into action by various Bush administration policies; through the media, an usual 
playing field for secularists. New technologies are also a precious tool for the young and well-
educated, two groups who are among the most secular in American society. What is new is that 
secularism appears now as a potential source of social capital
29
. This change is very important, as 
conservative forces have enjoyed an historical advantage due to their ability to mobilize strong 
networks and churchgoers. They are likely to retain their organizational advantage over secularists, but 
the gap is reducing.  
Religion may matter as a social universe offering opportunities for networking and gathering 
support, information, money or notoriety at five levels: in interfaith framework within Congress; in the 
small world of Washington; in constituencies; in denominational communities; and through religious 
lobbying. 
Firstly, religion works as a socializing network through prayer meetings at the House. Small 
spiritual gatherings enable meetings with other legislators, staffers and officials. Such events may 
provide bipartisan contacts, inspiration and even collective initiatives. There are also meetings 
between denominations testifying to a mutual curiosity, especially between Catholics and 
Evangelicals. Interfaith sociability is very important in the assembly as well as in American society. 
Two-third of Americans have at least one extended family member of another religion and mobility 
between denominations is very high, according to social or territorial mobility
30
. Hence, interactions 
between religious groups are seen as socially legitimate, morally sound and instrumental to 
understanding others in order to prepare alliances or even conversions.  
Religion is also part of the official institutional drama of the House. The opening prayer of each 
plenary session is performed by the Chaplain of the House, a Catholic priest
31
, belonging to the 
biggest organized denomination in the country, but far from representative of a nation composed of a 
majority of Protestants distributed in multiple affiliations. The ecumenical character of the act is thus 
strikingly underlined. Not all persons present in the room show concern and respect for the prayer 
which is very quickly executed. In contrast, the pledge to the flag which follows commands general 
attention and almost everybody participates, including staffers and visitors in the galleries
32
. Again, 
religion is clearly subordinated to civil religion for the greater national glory. 
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 Secondly, attendance at ceremonies in local Washington churches is a way for the politician who 
spends a few days per week in the capital to find a home away from home, local networks and soul-
mates.  
Thirdly and most importantly, participation in religious events held in the constituency is a political 
imperative for all members of the House, including events held by traditions other than their own 
affiliation. Congregations play a major role in the way religion is lived and in social life. 
Congregations represent a very Protestant model of religious organization, but it has been adopted by 
other denominations as well. For example, Islamic mosques in the US often offer Sunday Schools and 
imams are called upon to serve as counselors
33
. That is the reason why representatives have to attend 
religious assemblies at least a few times a year. This signals that he is concerned by local problems 
and an opportunity to receive feedback from electors. American parties do not have the same regular 
structures as their European counterparts to coordinate activists and to reach sympathizers or 
indifferent masses. Hence, the assistance provided by religious structures is all the more important. 
This is the very practical reason why, according to an expert observer of American political elites 
“many representatives call themselves religious, but do not really care. The religiosity of American 
politicians and the influence of religious lobbies are often overestimated, especially in Europe”.34  
A fourth form of socialization through religion is through belonging to a specific denomination. 
This is transversal as it can produce effects at the local level, in the House with fellow believers, on a 
national scale or trans-nationally by identification with spiritual authorities (such as the Vatican or 
Catholics) or minorities worldwide (such as Christians in China). The effects of socialization may vary 
according to the denomination. For example, when a Representative is identified as a Catholic, as well 
as when the constituency has a strong Catholic presence, he or she is more likely to show a high level 
of support for religious traditionalism. This effect is stronger for Catholicism than for other 
denominations
35
. One hypothesis is that the hierarchical organization of the Catholic Church and the 
efficiency of its lobbying ensure more disciplined respect for its teaching. However, the views of 
Catholic representatives and of the American episcopate frequently differ. Catholic American 
Congressmen are notably conservative on abortion or gay rights, but not on prayer at school
36
. In 
social policy, they are far more conservative than the progressive teachings of the Catholic Church and 
the American episcopacy
37
. 
Religious lobbying is a fifth channel of political socialization within a denomination or between 
denominations. There are more than two hundred religious interest groups identified on Capitol Hill (a 
quarter being multiple faith structures), employing at least one thousand people and spending at least 
$350 million a year. This religious lobbying in DC has a long history and a high level of 
professionalization, involving more than three hundred different issues
38
. The Congress 
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“accommodates yet checks” 39 various religious factions and works as a process where the “other” 
becomes less an enemy and more another participant in the lobbying competition. This reduces 
conflict in a way that the adversarial logic of the courts cannot match. It involves a mutual acceptation 
of religious interest groups who may have different and conflicting agendas but who have to play by 
the same rules. 
Religious lobbyists are also interesting in that they can be compared to politicians with a religious 
agenda to isolate the effect of the “religion” variable in American politics. Religious lobbyists are “in 
Washington but not of it”: they are part of the day-to-day game of power but maintain an irreducible 
specificity due to their prophetic message. They are insiders because they are immersed in 
Washington’s mechanisms. However, they define themselves as outsiders as they do not measure their 
impact solely and primarily in terms of wins and losses in the policy process. They challenge the 
whole political system by calling for global moral reforms
40
. They contest mainstream elite views 
which are alien to religion. Religious lobbyists rely mostly on grass roots mobilizations to put pressure 
on decision-making from the outside. They intend not only to influence one point on the agenda but to 
change of agenda in the name of a superior truth. In so doing, they do not derive their legitimacy from 
democratic consent, but meanwhile they may help to widen the debate, to include new audiences and 
to mobilize previously-quiescent citizens
41
. This self-cultivated marginality while remaining at the 
heart of politics is very similar to the positioning of politicians defining their action in religious terms. 
Religious lobbyists enjoy more freedom, as they do not depend on popular suffrage to keep their job. 
They do not pass through selecting processes likely to water down their message, as candidates to 
political offices do. But they do have to comply with the rules of moderation and aggregation which 
come with the parliamentary territory. 
The European model 
To disbelieve, but not too much 
Whereas complying with civil religion by displaying a moderate level of faith is the required norm for 
American legislators, a peaceful absence of religion appears the norm for an MEP. Levels of 
religiosity, observance, feeling of belonging and the importance given to religion all converge to 
underline that religion matters far more in the US than in Europe. To give a factual illustration of the 
differences in the social expectations towards rulers that frame American and European society, it is 
possible to use an indicator regularly used by international values surveys and which has also been 
applied in the research on MEPs. To the statement “politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for 
public office”, 32.1% of American citizens agree or agree strongly, compared with 11.1% of Germans, 
9.3% of French and only 3.3% in our sample of MEPs.
42
 This means that both in society and in 
European political circles, the espousal of religious beliefs is far from coterminous with the job of 
European representative. This does not prevent 62.2 % of our respondents in the RelEP survey from 
defining themselves as religious persons (a proportion which is probably overestimated as those 
politicians with the greatest proximity to religion were more willing to take the questionnaire), exactly 
the same proportion than the average Europeans in thirteen countries representing roughly the 
composition by nationality of the RelEP sample. 
                                                     
39
 Hertzke A. D., Representing God in Washington. The Role of Religious Lobbies in the American Polity, Knoxville, 
University of Tennessee Press, 1988, p. 201. 
40
 Hofrenning D. J. B., In Washington But Not Of It. The Prophetic Politics of Religious Lobbyists, Philadelphia, Temple 
University Press, 1995, p. 5. 
41
 Ibid., p. 183 
42
 Data dates from 2005 for the US and Germany, from 1999 for France, from 2013 for MEPs. See 
http://www.thearda.com/internationalData/index.asp, accessed 21/7/2011. 
François Foret 
12 
Being an MEP does not mean being hostile towards religion but is an invitation to be relatively 
discreet on the topic. The Parliament of course includes a proportion of frequent churchgoers who are 
very outspoken, but they are largely outnumbered by colleagues indifferent to religion. Looking at the 
broader picture and risking a typology, the standard profile of an MEP would be a non-believer 
acknowledging a religious heritage as a “cultural Christian” without attaching too much direct political 
relevance to this heritage, but leaving the door open for its indirect influence. The dominant view is 
best expressed in the words of a British Liberal: “[The EU] should have a policy respecting all, 
discriminating against none and insisting on separation between religion and politics”. This is 
congruent with the global mission of the EU. The EU respects national systems which all demarcate 
politics and religion under diverse institutional forms (even in systems with a formal State church), 
while acting for the protection and progression of fundamental individual rights. Subsequently, this 
idealized typical MEP – even as a firm supporter of secularism – may be open to arrangements with 
public norms in order to accommodate the religious preferences of individuals. For example, a 
majority of MEPs (significantly more than European citizens) agree that if a nurse were asked to help 
perform a legal abortion, she should be allowed to refuse on religious grounds. Here strict secularism 
is corrected by the prevalence of individual rights to religious freedom. It is evidence that European 
representatives are not “religiophobic”.  
In short, American legislators use religion as a consensual, permissive and self-restricted repertoire 
to discuss the public good and national identity. MEPs use an open and tolerant secularism instead of 
religion to do the same thing. This offers rhetoric material less suited to celebrating a vibrant European 
identity than to emphasizing a common set of principles rooted in human rights. The same mechanism 
of representation as an exacerbation of social realities may be at work at the House of Representatives 
and at the European Parliament: in Washington, religiosity is accentuated by the lip service of 
politicians, though qualified in its actual influence; in Brussels, secularism is celebrated, though 
implemented in a very flexible manner. 
The EP mirrors European societies 
Considering this general background, any homology between the religious preferences of MEPs with 
those of their constituents has very little relevance. Here, several broad structural factors combine their 
effects. European societies are highly secularized. MEPs are almost invisible political elites. Citizens 
most frequently do not know their European representatives and care even less about their personal 
characteristics. This means that the religiosity of MEPs is a non-question for the electorate. Besides, 
the mode of election by party lists and the way the Parliament works blur any possible scheme of 
accountability. Recent moves towards a territorialization of European elections through the design of 
regional constituencies seem unlikely to change anything. 
Largely emancipated from electoral pressures, religious MEPs may indulge themselves by 
following their conscience, especially on issues involving moral judgments. Some of them actually say 
they do so, even if religion intervenes for most MEPs more as a social and political reality to be 
tackled willy-nilly than as a personal inspiration. The range of competences of the EP does not provide 
for the exercise of everyday moral choices. However, a few political entrepreneurs may use their 
relative freedom to develop a “niche strategy” by standing on firm religious or anti-religious grounds. 
Inside the Parliament, this is a way of attracting like-minded colleagues and lobbies. Comparing the 
American and European cases, the interpretation is twofold. In the US, the general salience of religion 
tends to push religiously-minded political actors towards the centre by moderating their discourse in 
order to integrate religious arguments within advocacy coalitions, while secular representatives pay lip 
service to the required public reference to religion. In Europe, the general indifference towards 
religion can encourage religiously-minded actors without much hope of recognition to develop 
extreme views and controversial tactics in order to gain public attention. Meanwhile, moderately 
religious MEPs comply with the dominant secularism as they do in national politics and inscribe their 
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discourses under the auspices of pluralism and relativism. This hypothesis ought to be tested further, 
including in national Parliaments.  
Compared with the US where the religious imperative may influence the public display of other social 
identities such as sexual orientation, religiosity is a far less salient issue for MEPs who are under less 
scrutiny. Again, the low religiosity of European societies coupled with public indifference towards 
MEPs leave their private preferences largely unquestioned. 
A total lack of data on the religious affiliations of MEPs prevents assessment of the impact of 
social change in the population on the denominational composition of the legislative body. The RelEP 
project made an initial contribution towards filling the gap by casting light on the religious preferences 
of the roughly one hundred and fifty MEPs who agreed to answer, but does not offer a complete view 
of the assembly. What makes the EU specific is that the frontiers of the polity are constantly enlarging 
to include new populations, thus modifying the demographic balance between denominations. MEPs 
of new post-2004 member states are perceived by their Western counterparts to be more religious and 
outspoken about their beliefs. However, this distinction merits re-examination. National, political and 
religious affiliations are intertwined. MEPs from new member states are further to the right of the 
political spectrum than their Western counterparts, and thus more likely to have a greater proximity to 
religion and a greater conservatism on issues related to religion. This does not mean that Eastern 
MEPs feel less European – rather the contrary – or are less supportive of European integration.43 Thus, 
it is very difficult to isolate the effect of denominational affiliations. 
Overall, 66.7% of MEPs agree that religion does not create differences between MEPs who are 
Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox or from other denominations (33.3% have the opposite opinion), but 
they almost unanimously (82.8%) state that religion has variable importance depending on the 
nationality of the politician. The EP has to deal with less denominational diversity than the House of 
Representatives, but a deeper cultural and political diversity. National affiliation prevails totally over 
religious affiliation and, furthermore, drives it. Depending on their experience of a specific 
configuration of relationships between Church and State and their positioning within a domestic 
political context, representatives experience their denominational identity in diverse ways. A German 
Catholic keeping an eye on the fiscal status of German Churches is more interested in economic issues 
related to religion, while an Italian Catholic concerned by the controversy on religious signs in 
classrooms is more active in debates about the regulation of religious pluralism in the public space. 
Religious affiliation is no longer in itself an autonomous variable in the allocation of top positions 
in the EP. The Presidency has frequently been held by leaders known to be pious and observant 
Catholics, but in the main this reflects the domination of Christian democrats and demographic 
balances more than a denominational coalition. What matters is more a compliance with the moderate 
secularism understood as the common ground for all Europeans than the content of the personal faith. 
A good illustration was offered by the contest between Jerzy Buzek and Mario Mauro as candidates 
for the Presidency of the Parliament in 2009
44
. Far from being a confrontation between Protestants 
supporting Buzek and Catholics supporting Mauro, the debate inside the EP was polarized by the 
opposition of some nationalities (especially French and Belgians, but also Italians) who considered 
that Mauro was unacceptable due to his proximity to the Holy See and its conservatism. There were 
also concerns were also that his appointment would be perceived all across the legislative body as a 
provocation and could endanger the agreement with the PSE about the EPP/PSE rotation in the 
Presidency. In the end, Mauro was asked to withdraw. All these cases must be understood against the 
background of the founding controversy related to religion in the selection of European rulers, the 
Buttiglione affair in 2004. What was mainly an inter-institutional arm-wrestling bout between the 
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Parliament and the Council with the Commission as an unfortunate casualty was narrated as the story 
of the martyrdom of an inexperienced Catholic (which Buttiglione by no means was) by the soulless 
politics played out in Brussels
45
. In the Buttiglione affair as in other events, political sensitivities 
framed by national cultures, together with institutional pressure for compromise and requirement to 
comply with pluralism and moderation prevailed over denominational affiliation or religious/secular 
opposition. 
Religion and socialization in Brussels and beyond 
Given the far lesser salience of religion in Europe than in the US, it is no surprise that it offers fewer 
opportunities for socialization. Inside the Parliament, religion is not integrated within institutional 
rituals as is the case in the House of Representatives with the opening prayer. Actually, signs of 
religious presence are the subject of ongoing controversies, from rooms dedicated to spiritual or 
philosophical meditation to meetings of the President of the EP with religious leaders. The presence of 
religion in the parliamentary space reveals something about the EP’s rationale for dealing with it. 
Meditation rooms are offered to MEPs in Brussels and Strasbourg to use as they see fit. According to a 
regulation by the quaestors
46
, rooms are reserved for spiritual reflection to the exclusion of other 
events. No permanent feature referring to a specific religion may be displayed in this space, which has 
to remain neutral in order to be available and welcoming for all. All religious items must be stored in a 
closet in the relaxation room to avoid any confusion.  
Activities gathering like-minded MEPs, staff and activists, have multiplied in recent years. One the 
one hand, the EPP has launched several initiatives to activate networks and events, revitalizing to a 
certain extent its Christian-Democratic roots. On the other hand, secular forces have tried to 
counterbalance what they perceive as a religious reawakening by organizing platforms and 
conferences
47
. 
Different non-official structures test the potentiality of political socialization on a religious basis 
beyond party and national boundaries. Inter-groups must be distinguished from working groups. Inter-
groups allow members of different commissions to meet on topics of common interest and to develop 
cross-sectional views, as well as to consult with relevant NGOs and lobbies. As they have no resources 
provided by the Parliament, they frequently have to rely on resources offered by a lobby in order to 
function.
48
 Inter-groups are not purely deliberative as they may produce coordinated legislative action, 
although their actual influence is almost impossible to assess. The creation of inter-groups is regulated 
by an internal EP regulation stipulating that they require the support of MEPs from three different 
political groups.
49
 This means that inter-groups are not likely to emerge around topics which are the 
province of a single political family or too divisive to allow bridges to be built between different 
ideological traditions. This is why the more militant initiatives are bound to be taken in the context of 
working groups, structures without precise requirements which provide an opportunity to create 
freely-communicating platforms and to give the illusion of a coalition broader than its actual support. 
Given the low salience of religion in European politics, the recruitment and impact of working groups 
may be difficult. The main purpose of such initiatives seems frequently to achieve visibility for the 
promoters or to raise awareness among MEPs rather than searching actual policy effects. Two 
examples are offered here, to be analyzed against the background of what was said about the 
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American case: the Ecumenical intergroup, which aims at building up a Christian alliance with a 
relatively broad scope; and the Working Group on Human Dignity, promoting a more muscular and 
conservative agenda. 
At first sight, Ecumenism is in total congruence with the pluralist and dialogic ideals of European 
integration, notwithstanding the fact that it is circumscribed to Christianity. It does not refer to a 
specific social constituency and functions more as an abstract principle than a watchword. The 
Ecumenical intergroup was launched in September 2009 by László Tőkés, a former bishop of the 
Reformed Church of Romania, as well as former activist during the 1989 Revolution, member of the 
Hungarian minority and party traveller from the Greens to the EPP. This group claims, according to 
its original manifesto
50, “to join efforts to strengthen Europe’s Christian roots”. The Christian heritage 
is stressed as a vital element building a strong and harmonious Europe. Regular meetings are planned 
during plenary sessions in Strasbourg, in order to share ideas and individual experiences and integrate 
Christian values in European policy making. The doctrine of the Ecumenical intergroup is ambiguous 
as it promotes interreligious dialog but in order to reinforce Christianity, and Ecumenism is intra-
Christian
51
. The entrepreneurship of Tőkés has been successful in personal terms as he became a – 
controversial – vice-president of the European Parliament in May 2010, with special responsibility for 
dialogue with religious and philosophical communities. The overall impact of the Ecumenical 
intergroup is more doubtful as it received little political and media attention following its well-
publicized launch in 2009. 
Shifting now to more muscular endeavors, the Working Group on Human Dignity offers an 
example of embattled Christians banding together in European politics. This Group, inaugurated on 25 
March 2009, aimed at strengthening the public profile of the European Christian Political Movement 
(ECPM), a political association of Christian Democrat parties and organizations which are active at all 
levels of Europe governance. The movement played a significant role in the debate on the Christian 
heritage of Europe at the beginning of the 2000s. The official goal of the working group is not to 
evangelize, but a clear hierarchy between religions is put forward to suggest that democracy is 
historically a Christian development
52
. An interesting feature is the territorial scope of the structure. 
According to its founding charter, the ambition is “to enable the European Parliament to influence 
policy making all other the world”. The ECPM, the matrix of the group, recruits a large part of its 
members outside the EU (in Eastern Europe, Russia, and the USA)
53
. This global strategy may be a 
way to counter-balance the weakness of forces in Europe. Repertoires of action are multiple, as the 
founders of the working group are also the promoters of an NGO, the Dignitatis Humanae Institute. 
Defined as a “grassroots-led organization to promote human dignity in the political and cultural 
spheres internationally”, the Dignitatis Humanae Institute intends to coordinate working groups in 
national and European Parliaments
54
 in order to fight back against Christianophobia. 
The whole structure seems rather lightweight, relying on volunteering and symbolic political 
patrons (such as Rocco Buttiglione). The parliamentary working group does not seem to be the strong 
point of the conglomerate, suggesting that the main battle takes place within the public and media 
spheres. It exemplifies the strategy of religious groups declining to search for a catch-all message and 
a coalition-building approach, and prioritizing instead an expressive function in order to mobilize the 
already convinced and attract attention.  
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In Brussels understood as a social universe, the quest for religious sociability is limited to MEPs who 
have a high level of religious observance and who spend long periods in the European capital, two 
important restrictive factors. Besides this, mobility between Brussels and Strasbourg is a further 
obstacle for the constitution of dense religious networks. The growing strength of religious lobbying is 
nonetheless rapid and may contribute towards increasing the salience of religious topics in the 
Brussels “microcosm”. Overall, most of our interviewees said they have contact with religious lobbies 
a few time over a year or a term (57.3%), one-fifth more frequently (21% at least once a month) and 
15.8% never. Religious lobbying follows predominantly denominational and national patterns, is 
dependent on the already existing religiosity of the MEPs and does not seem to have a transformative 
influence on political choices. 
The role of religion in the relationship between an MEP and his or her constituency is similarly 
constrained by the fact that few people care very much about either religion or Europe in most 
member states. Religion is not likely to be a very important element in the weak scheme of 
accountability to which a European representative is subjected. However, religious networks may 
surface in the public relations strategy an MEP will develop to nurture his or her links with organized 
civil society. Several MEPs said they were struck by the number of priests in cassocks or nuns in 
cowls or cornets in the corridors of the EP at the invitation of their counterparts from new member 
states. These contacts, which oscillate between political communication with the general public and 
political dialog with private interests, should be considered a non-formal form of feedback for MEPs. 
Similarly, grassroots initiatives are developing, such as the “prayers for the European Union”55 in 
several religious communities in Brussels and all over Europe. This may be a kind of 
“Europeanization from below”, initiated generally by private individuals but which contributes 
towards defining the social background within which religious MEPs move. 
Finally, denominational solidarity is not very perceptible in the life of the institution and in 
European politics. 66.7% of MEPs interviewed in our survey consider that religion does not create any 
differences between MEPs who are Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox or from other religions. Protestants 
and Orthodox may simply find sometimes that, in identity politics, the reference to the “Christian 
heritage of Europe” is too much associated with “Catholic heritage”. The overwhelming demographic 
domination of Christianity in the Parliament does not really allow the smallest denominations 
(Muslims, Jews) to emerge as proper forces. Cultural differences between denominations probably 
exist, but they are so mixed with and overpowered by national differences that they are impossible to 
observe. A Polish Catholic is still seen as more Polish than Catholic. However as a Polish he is 
supposed to be Catholic. This assignation of identity provokes the dismay of some victims of national 
stereotypes, a Polish secularist MEP being considered as surprising and almost “abnormal” by some of 
his colleagues. Ultimately, the most significant gap is said to be between religious and non-religious 
MEPs rather than between denominations.  
Having examined the general socio-political background in which to situate the place of religion 
and the extent and channels taken by its influence on legislators in the US and in Europe, the challenge 
is to reverse the analysis and to ask what can be the influence of the parliamentary institution on 
religion. 
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The effects of parliamentary institutions on religion 
The effects of the longevity in office on politicians 
In US legislative politics, the individual experience of a Representative is important for the way he or 
she deals with religion. A freshman in the Capitol does not handle his or her religious penchants in the 
same way as a veteran. Seasoned legislators are considered more likely to compromise on moral issues 
than newcomers. This does not mean that a Congressman who has several terms under his or her belt 
is more secularized. In fact, the House of Representatives does not seem to have the capacity to alter 
personal religious preferences. But the more deals you have cut, the more likely you are to cut some 
more by going beyond cultural conflicts. One socializing effect of the institution can be acknowledged 
in the legislator’s concern to make the institutional machine work, and his or her increasing knowledge 
of how to do so. And this knowledge involves the awareness that coalitions are not built by quoting 
the Bible. 
The experience of the legislator may have other influences. The more mature a politician is, the 
more likely he or she is to have strong enough positions and resources to secure re-election. This 
means that on moral issues, the legislator will vote more according to his or her personal preferences 
and less according to the preferences of his or her constituency or party. Conversely, the electoral 
longevity of a representative is positively correlated with his or her propensity to work with 
denominational lobbies. Indeed, as illustrated in American State assemblies, religious interest groups 
tend to have fewer resources and different methods from economic lobbies. They do not “wine and 
dine” legislators, but rather establish personal contacts based on common moral views through long-
term exchanges. Any significant turn-over among legislators is bad news for public interest 
organizations like religious lobbies
56
. 
This importance of stability in political personnel does not augur well for the ability of religious 
interest groups to socialize with MEPs considering the very significant level of turnover after each 
European election. Roughly half of MEPs (49.6%) are “first timers” and less than one quarter has 
three terms or more under their belt
57
. Representatives of peripheral forces may build themselves a 
niche as advocates for religion or secularism and search for re-election if they are able to secure 
constant electoral support, however small. But for candidates running in major parties, to be the 
spokesperson of a denominational faction in Brussels is not much of an insurance (and maybe more of 
a handicap) against the risk of being bypassed by national party leaders when it is time to constitute 
party lists.  
Still less than the House of Representatives, the EP does not alter the personal preferences of MEPs 
regarding religion. Almost half of our respondents (45.4%) consider that the place of religion in the 
European Parliament is different from their experiences in national politics, but 84.7% declare that 
notwithstanding this, their experience in Brussels and Strasbourg failed to change their views on the 
relationships between religion and politics. The 15.3% whose views have changed tend more to be 
struck by what they perceived as excessively strong religious lobbying, they tend more to be non-
religious and atheists, and their evolution is rather towards a greater vigilance about or promotion of 
secularism or simply a new concern about how to tackle the religious issue. Following an inverse 
logic, some – pretty rare – MEPs testify that their confrontation with European post-national 
materialism and with the moral relativism of counterparts of other nationalities has given them fresh 
energy to renew their fight for their beliefs. Finally, in the same way again as in the US, committed 
believers may learn how to disagree according to Brussels rules: they take up symbolic postures (for 
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example about the reference to the Christian heritage of Europe) while playing the game of 
compromise to make Parliament work.  
Scholarship is ambivalent about the propensity of MEPs to “go native” after several years in 
Brussels and Strasbourg. Famous examples exist of well-known MEPs who are not at all 
professionalized. Still, European representatives play their roles in diverse ways depending on their 
level of commitment, their political loyalty and so on
58
. An MEP protesting against the way the EU 
works has more chance of mobilizing religion as a protest resource and more incentive to do so. An 
MEP who sees himself as a policy wonk bringing his intellectual contribution to the conceptualization 
of European policies also has opportunities to find potential inspiration in religion. An MEP who 
claims to be a specialist who knows everything worth knowing about the institutional cogs of 
decision-making has few opportunities to draw upon spiritual inspirations and agendas. The same 
applies to a representative whose main purpose is to act as go-between between his electors, organized 
interests and European institutions, unless religious motivations frame the agenda of his or her 
constituency.  
Effects of the longevity of religiously-loaded issues on the political agenda 
Apart from the electoral longevity of politicians, the longevity of issues also needs to be taken into 
account. A fresh battle involving moral choices and possibly affronting religious beliefs will provoke 
more turmoil than a recurrent controversy where the arguments, stakes and actors are already known, 
and maybe eroded by time. At the House of Representatives, debates on abortion are frequently 
bypassed in order to avoid open confrontations and turned into technical discussions on funding 
mechanisms. This means that legislators do not discuss the legality of and justification for abortion or 
the balance between the good and bad effects of the contraceptive pill, trusting the experts to establish 
the ends of reproductive policy. They limit themselves to celebrations of consensual family values, 
with lyrical variations, and to negotiating ways and means. This makes it easier to take political 
responsibility for an abstention which does not as appear as a moral betrayal. Besides, the duration of 
the controversy suggests that there is probably a robust correspondence between the attitudes of 
legislators and constituencies, as opinions have become stabilized. Traditionalists may be frustrated at 
not being able to reopen the case, but they have to be content with the status quo as a lesser evil. This 
practice of routinization is however only possible when the status quo does exist and/or when a 
decision is reached by another authority, generally the Supreme Court. More recent problems on the 
agenda such as progressive sexuality have been less routinized
59
. Codification routines are developing 
in Washington in order to prevent fierce parliamentary guerrilla actions, but isolated acts of bravado 
cannot be excluded. The gradual cooling of the Don’t Ask Don’t Tell controversy about how to deal 
with homosexuality in the army may be an example of how the legislature is coming to term with the 
issue. 
The emergence of ethical and religious questions on the EP’s agenda is relatively recent and its 
new salience following the 2004 and 2007 enlargements and polarization on the subject of the Turkish 
candidature still newer. Routinization may not have had the time to develop. Already, the dealings 
with issues such as research on stem cells show evidence of a learning curve. In its history, the 
European Parliament (like the European political system as a whole) has shown a considerable 
capacity to adapt and to accommodate cultural and ideological diversity while preserving its delicate 
mechanisms of compromise-building. One bet would be that the EP will manage to find a way to 
regulate disagreements on ethical issues to the reduced extent that it is obliged, given the competences 
of the EU. Conversely, the resilient differences between nationalities in levels of cultural liberalism 
                                                     
58
 Navarro J., Les députés européens et leur rôle. Sociologie des pratiques parlementaires, Bruxelles, Editions de 
l’Université de Bruxelles, 2009 
59
 Oldmixon (2005), p. 28. 
Democratic representation and religion at the European Parliament and the US House of Representatives 
19 
and above all in the ways in which debates are framed do not suggest that trans-European cleavages 
are likely to emerge to structure party re-alignments within a unified European political field. In other 
words, controversies on abortion or homosexuality do not offer immediate structures providing 
opportunities to Europeanize political and public spaces. 
Conclusion 
American and European realities mirror each other, with an inversion of the reflection. In the US, the 
standard is to believe but not too much; in Europe, to disbelieve but not too much. Both configurations 
confirm the imperative of “displaying the required credentials” for all politicians. There is the same 
propensity to follow a “catch-all” strategy and to comply with the prevailing cultural codes in society 
in order to avoid antagonizing parts of the electorate. This does not mean that representatives are 
hypocritical or economical with the truth: they are simply doing their job of synthesizing divergent 
visions and building coalitions for decision-making. This being said, differences in American and 
European socio-cultural configurations create distinct incentives. Greater cultural diversity in the US 
may offer more “niche markets” to political entrepreneurs appealing to specific denominations or 
religious groups, the religious factor being intertwined with territorial and class belongings. The weak 
personalization of European elections which blurs the profile of individual candidates and 
secularization mean that religion is not really efficient in winning over electors. Nevertheless, in the 
US as in Europe, a strong religious message may be a way to gain political and media exposure for 
peripheral forces, mostly on the extremes, but this comes with a cost. Intransigence on religious topics 
prevents representatives from compromising and building larger coalitions within and between parties, 
meaning that it is a renunciation of high office.  
A provocative hypothesis to be tested more in depth is that the EP, due to its secondary status to 
national politics, could be more welcoming than the Congress for Christian conservatives willing to 
promote a strong religious agenda. These “soldiers of God” (Wilcox) know that they have little to lose 
as they are not able to influence European decision-making. Their only chance to be re-elected is to 
rely on a political message which is quite distinctive from mainstream parties. In such a strategy of 
subversion, religion may be instrumental to stir a controversy by frontally opposing pluralism and 
moderation. In short, the EP would keep religion at bay when the Congress domesticates it more in 
day-to-day politics, but would provide more structures of opportunity in the margins. 
To speak now of representation as the reflection of society, the American Congress seems more 
hospitable to religious minorities, in congruence with a political culture promoting diversity. The 
comparison with the EP on this point is difficult for two reasons: religious identities are far less 
significant in Europe and consequently less likely to be turned into a basis for representation; there is 
little data to check the religious composition of the EP. Our survey suggests that majority religions at 
the national levels are over-represented in echo to the cujus regio, ejus religio principle ruling 
throughout European history, and that other groups (Jews, Muslims) are absent or at least invisible. 
In the EU, there is also less religious pressure likely to prevent the free expression of other potentially 
conflictual identities. Being openly gay is far less of a problem for an MEP than for a member of the 
House of Representatives, all the more so as the MEP is probably not well-known enough to be 
subject to public scrutiny. Conversely, there is less incentive on the European side to search for 
religious sociability. For a Congressman, religion may bridge the gap between parties through 
interfaith structures, bring political resources through interaction with lobbies and provide networks at 
home in constituencies and away from home in Washington. For an MEP, this socializing function is 
far more modest. 
Finally, in the US as in the EU, the Parliament as an institution is not able to alter the beliefs of 
representatives but may act on the way these beliefs are formulated. The longer a politician has sat in 
an assembly, the more likely he or she is to internalize the requirement of compromise and to adopt a 
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low profile as regards the affirmation of religious values. Similarly, the longer an issue has been on the 
political agenda, the more likely it is that a way of agreeing how to disagree has emerged.  
Overall, significant differences between American and European political systems are illustrated, 
mostly due to divergences in the intensity and social meaning of religion and secularism. But once 
these differences have been acknowledged, the logics at work frequently appear to be commensurable. 
There is no distinction in nature between the two cases. This suggests that the EU, like other polities, 
meets the fundamental challenge to articulate politics and religion and to accommodate it in a specific 
but not exceptional way.  
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